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NOTES
TORTS-PRODUCT LIABILITY-ARKANSAS ADOPTS COMMENT K AS
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG ACTIONS. West v.
Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 806 S.W.2d 608 (1991).
In 1971, pursuant to a doctor's prescription, Mrs. Gari West be-
gan using Ovulen-28, an oral contraceptive manufactured by Searle &
Co. and distributed by G.D. Searle & Co. and Searle Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (collectively referred to as "Searle").1 Mrs. West, under the direc-
tion of her physician, used this contraceptive on and off until 1983.2 In
that year, she underwent extensive surgery when a benign liver tumor
ruptured.3
Mrs. West and her husband sued Searle in a products liability ac-
tion alleging that Ovulen-28 caused her to develop the benign liver tu-
mor. 4 The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Searle: (1) had defectively
designed and manufactured the drug; (2) had breached the warranty of
fitness; and (3) had been negligent in warning of the danger of the
drug. 5 They sought recovery under theories of strict liability, breach of
warranty, and negligence.6 After limited discovery, the circuit court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that
no question of fact existed.7 The plaintiffs appealed to the Arkansas
Supreme Court, which affirmed in part and reversed in part.8
1. Brief for Appellants at 1, West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 806 S.W.2d 608 (1991)
(No. 90-49).
2. Id.




7. Id. at 36, 806 S.W.2d at 610.
8. Id. at 35, 806 S.W.2d at 610. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of one
count-strict liability for defective design. The court held that all of the claims failed to provide
adequate factual pleading upon which relief could be granted, but Searle had tacitly admitted this
one cause of action by answering with the defense of unavoidably unsafe products. Id. at 37, 806
S.W.2d at 611. The other claims, breach of warranty of fitness, negligence and strict liability for
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The supreme court adopted comment k to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts section 402A, also referred to as the "unavoidably unsafe
products" exception to strict liability for defective products, into Ar-
kansas law." The court elected to apply comment k doctrine as an af-
firmative defense requiring the defendant to prove lack of an alterna-
tive feasible design. 10 It also held that a defendant must show that
there was adequate warning of the risk of harm before it may raise this
defense.1" Finally, the court ruled that the "learned intermediary rule"
applies to warnings regarding oral contraceptives. 2 West v. Searle &
Co., 305 Ark. 33, 806 S.W.2d 608 (1991).
Comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
was written in response to the spectre of large liability judgments de-
terring the development and production of socially necessary and bene-
ficial prescription products.13 Dean Prosser cautioned about the dangers
of imposing standard rules for strict liability with respect to prescrip-
tion drugs:
manufacturing defect, and negligence and strict liability for inadequate warning, were all dis-
missed with leave to amend. Id. at 36-37, 806 S.W.2d at 610-11.
9. Id. at 39, 806 S.W.2d at 612. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k
(1965) provides in full:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging conse-
quences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the una-
voidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper direction and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which
for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescrip-
tion of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to
which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there
can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experi-
ence as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are
properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls
for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful
and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
10. 305 Ark. at 40, 806 S.W.2d at 612.
11. Id. at 42, 806 S.W.2d at 613.
12. Id. at 44, 806 S.W.2d at 614.
13. 38 A.L.I. PROC. 19, at 91-92 (1961) (as an example of potentially large judgments, one
of the speakers noted that in spite of the obvious benefit to society of polio vaccination programs,
the maker of the live polio vaccine faced potential liability in excess of $100 million).
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The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous prod-
ucts should make good the harm, distribute it by liability insurance,
and add the cost to the price of the product, encounters reason for
pause, when we consider that two of the greatest medical boons to the
human race, penicillin and cortisone, both have their dangerous side
effects, and that drug companies might well have been deterred from
producing and selling them.
1 4
Dean Prosser described these drugs as unavoidably dangerous because
they cannot be made safe in the present state of human skill and
knowledge.15 Although there is unavoidable risk of harm, the utility of
the product outweighs the risk of harm, and under strict liability the
product is not considered defective or unreasonably dangerous."
In 1961 the participants at the annual meeting of the American
Law Institute initially discussed creating an exception to strict liability
for prescription drugs.17 They were concerned that large liability judg-
ments might drive smaller drug companies out of business or persuade
both larger and smaller drug companies not to pursue expensive re-
search programs.' 8 The membership also discerned a difference be-
tween nonessential prescription products, such as hair removal agents,
and markedly beneficial products, such as drugs for treating cancer.' 9
As the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Dean Pros-
ser incorporated these concerns into comment k.10 Under strict liability,
a manufacturer that sold a product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user would be liable for resulting injury regardless
14. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 99, at 661 (4th ed. 1971).
When a product is introduced into the stream of commerce, strict liability focuses upon the prod-
uct itself, and an injured party does not have to prove that the manufacturer of the product was
negligent. Three different types of product defects arise in the context of strict liability. First,
there may be a flaw in the manufacturing process, such as a Coca Cola bottle that is made defec-
tively and explodes. Next, the product may be manufactured correctly, but the design of the
product is unreasonably dangerous. Finally, the product may be defective because there are inade-
quate instructions or warnings of danger. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 99 at 695 (5th ed. 1984). Comment k exempts certain prescription products
from design defect claims, but the manufacturer is still liable for manufacturing defect and failure
to warn claims. See John P. Reilly, The Erosion of Comment K, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 255, 257-
58 (1989).
15. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 99, at 660.
16. M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6.13, at 235 (2d ed. 1988).
17. 38 A.L.I. Proc. 19, 90 (1961).
18. Id. at 92.
19. Id. at 93.
20. Id. at 97-98.
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of the exercise of reasonable care."1 The comment k doctrine estab-
lishes an exception to strict liability for a special category of products,
common in the field of medicine, in which the benefit of the product
exceeds the risk of harm." Comment k provides that even though these
products are unavoidably hazardous, they should not be considered un-
reasonably dangerous when they are properly prepared and accompa-
nied by proper directions and adequate warnings of the risk of harm."
The American Law Institute members also debated whether this
exception to strict liability should include all prescription drugs.' The
participants, however,, could not agree upon the wording of an exemp-
tion for prescription products, and Dean Prosser elaborated on the
group's concerns in comment k.'5
In the years since the drafting of comment k, drug companies' re-
actions have confirmed that potential liability deters drug manufactur-
ers from marketing prescription products. In the 1970s, the manufac-
turers of a new influenza vaccine refused to supply it because of
liability concerns.' 6 The cost of the childhood vaccine for diptheria-per-
tussis-tetanus (DPT) skyrocketed in the 1980s, increasing from $0.11
in 1982 to $11.40 in 1986. The increase has been associated with the
dramatic rise in the number of DPT lawsuits filed-from one in 1978
to 219 in 1985.' 7 Benedictin, the only antinausea drug available to
pregnant women, was withdrawn from the market in 1983 because of
the outrageously high cost of insurance.'8
In response to these potential liability problems, almost all juris-
dictions adopted comment k.29 Only one court has rejected the doc-
21. MADDEN, supra note 16, § 6.13, at 235.
22. MADDEN, supra note 16, § 6.13, at 235. See also Plummer v. Lederle Lab., 819 F.2d
349, 356 (2d Cir. 1987) (even though the injection of a vaccine may result in damaging complica-
tions, the diseases prevented by the vaccine also produce terrible injuries).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
24. 38 A.L.I. PROC. 19, 95-96 (1961).
25. Id. at 96. But see Unavoidably Unsafe Products and the Design Defect Theory: An
Analysis of Applying Comment K to Strict Liability and Negligence Claims, 15 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1989) (the A.L.I. membership's vote, see supra note 24, is not reflected in
comment k).
26. Marc A. Franklin & Joseph E. Mais, Jr., Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs:
Lessons from the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CAL. L. REV. 754, 769 (1977).
27. Gina Kolata, Litigation Causes those Price Increases in Childhood Vaccines, SCI. June
13, 1986, at 1339.
28. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) (repeating statements by de-
fendant E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.).
29. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.) (applying Texas law), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
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trine.3 0 The comment k defense has been allowed when doctors have
ordered or prescribed therapeutic drugs, vaccines, blood products, and
intrauterine devices.8 1
Courts take two basic approaches when applying comment k. The
majority of states use comment k as an affirmative defense,82 requiring
the defendant manufacturer to prove that the drug's benefit to society
outweighs the risk of harm. 8 This view requires a case-by-case analysis
of the drug compared to feasible, alternative products available at the
time the drug was marketed.3 " A small number of courts have rejected
this approach and instead apply comment k as a blanket exemption for
all prescription drugs.35 This interpretation of comment k insulates the
drug manufacturer from strict liability and holds it to the basic negli-
1973) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Beetler v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.,
431 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1970) (applying Illinois law); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385
F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967) (applying Oklahoma law), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Patten v.
Lederle Lab., 676 F. Supp. 233 (D. Utah 1987) (applying Utah law); Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins
Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984) (applying Colorado law); Williams v. Lederle Lab., 591
F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (applying Ohio law); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1978); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986); Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods., Inc., 486 A.2d 712 (D.C.
1985); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co.,
718 P.2d 1318 (Kan. 1986); Dunn v. Lederle Lab., 328 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982);
Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d
1305 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Davila v. Bodelson, 704 P.2d 1119 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
30. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). In
Collins the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that comment k was too restrictive upon the use
of strict liability in Wisconsin, although the court recognized that in some exigent circumstances it
may be necessary to place the drug on the market without adequate testing. Id. at 52.
31. In discussions of comment k, the commentators loosely use the terms "prescription prod-
ucts" and "drugs" to include those things for which the Food and Drug Administration requires a
doctor's order or prescription. See, e.g., Sidney H. Willig, The Comment k Character.- A Concep-
tual Barrier to Strict Liability, 29 MERCER L. REv. 545, 563-72 (1978).
32. See cases cited supra note 29.
33. See, e.g., Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986) (the manu-
facturer presented sufficient evidence to show that the benefits from an oral contraceptive out-
weighed the risks); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983) (the
manufacturer is held to the knowledge and experience of an expert in the field regarding known
risks); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987) (the court suggests parameters to evalu-
ate risk-benefit, see infra text accompanying notes 39-45). See also Willig, supra note 31, at 556-
57 (the defendant's responsibilities regarding knowledge of the risk of harm).
34. See, e.g., Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 464 (1985) (suggesting parameters
to assist the trial judge in deciding whether the manufacturer is allowed to use the comment k
defense).
35. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying
New York law); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d
21 (Okla. 1982); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1978).
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gence or fault-based standard.36
By restricting the use of comment k to an affirmative defense, the
majority rule encourages the manufacturer to produce only socially val-
uable drugs."a The selective application of the comment k doctrine pro-
motes research and production of highly beneficial drugs needed to
treat serious illness because the manufacturer is not held strictly liable
for the unavoidable side effects of the treatment.38 However, the phar-
maceutical company must show that there was no safer, alternative
treatment at the time the drug was marketed, which means the com-
pany is not shielded from strict liability if an alternative product posed
a smaller risk of harm. 9 In this manner, the courts use comment k as
an affirmative defense to balance the tort law considerations of promot-
ing safety and compensating an injured party while simultaneously ad-
vancing the production of important products.'
Those courts adopting comment k as an affirmative defense were
confronted with how to measure the value of the drug compared to the
risk of harm. One method of analysis, which has received the endorse-
ment of several other jurisdictions,"1 was proposed by the Supreme
Court of Idaho in Toner v. Lederle Laboratories.42 The plaintiff in
Toner was a minor who developed paralysis after an injection of the
pertussis vaccine.'3 The court reasoned that "unavoidably unsafe"
under comment k requires that there must have been no feasible alter-
native to accomplish the vaccine's purpose with lesser risk." The Toner
court stated a four part test to be used in determining if a drug is
"unavoidably unsafe" and found that the vaccine satisfied this test. The
four factors are (1) the magnitude of the product's risk that the alter-
native avoids; (2) the financial costs of the product compared to the
36. Reilly, supra note 14, at 257.
37. Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy
behind Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1985). Schwartz concludes that com-
ment k balances the basic tort law conditions of deterrence, incentives for safety, and compensa-
tion to favor socially valuable drugs. Id. at 1143 n.37.
38. Schwartz, supra note 37, at 1143.
39. See, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 305 (Idaho 1987).
40. Schwartz, supra note 37, at 1141.
41. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas
law); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1301 (D. Minn. 1988) (applying Min-
nesota law); Patten v. Lederle Lab., 676 F. Supp. 233, 237 (D. Utah 1987) (applying Utah law);
White v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 1988).
42. 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987).
43. Id. at 299.
44. Id. at 306.
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alternative design; (3) the benefits of the product compared to the al-
ternative design; and (4) the safety of the product compared to the
alternative design, including the risks of the alternative design.
45
The great majority of jurisdictions determine whether to allow the
defendant manufacturer to raise the comment k defense by using a
risk-benefit analysis similar to Toner.4" The courts attempt to quantify
the benefit from the drug compared to the risk of harm.47 Then the
courts decide whether the manufacturer is allowed to use the affirma-
tive defense of comment k as a matter of law."
A small minority of jurisdictions reject the affirmative defense ap-
proach and instead apply comment k to exempt all prescription drugs
from strict liability."9 In Brown v. Superior Court50 the California Su-
preme Court outlined three basic policy reasons supporting the minor-
ity view. First, the court reasoned that a case-by-case analysis of drug
products is a disincentive to the development and production of new
drugs because the manufacturer cannot predict whether the drug would
be eligible for favorable treatment. 51 Second, the manufacturer is de-
terred from providing a superior product if a trial court might decide,
years later, that another product could have accomplished the same re-
sult with less risk.52 Finally, the Food and Drug Administration must
test and approve the new prescription drug before it is sold. Any fur-
ther delay while the manufacturer tests for unknown risks would not
serve the public interest since the new drug might save lives or reduce
pain and suffering.
53
Whether comment k is applied to all prescription drugs or only as
an affirmative defense, the manufacturer must show that adequate
warning was given about the harmful risks and side effects of the drug
before the defense is allowed. 5' Usually, the prescription product manu-
45. Id.
46. See cases cited supra notes 29 & 41.
47. See, e.g., Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, (Ct. App. 1985), overruled in part
by, Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Lindsey v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law); McKee v. Moore, 648
P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1978).
50. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
51. Id. at 482.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 479.
54. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) requires that the product
is "accompanied by proper directions and warning." See supra note 9 for full text of comment k.
1991]
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facturer is shielded from an inadequate warning claim by the learned
intermediary rule. 5
According to the learned intermediary rule, the physician is inter-
posed between the drug manufacturer and the user of the drug."
Rather than a direct warning to the patient, the company's duty to
warn can be satisfied by warning the physician who selects the drug.
57
Since the physician makes an independent judgment in the patient's
interest, early cases concluded that patient labelling was superfluous.58
The common policy was to allow the drug manufacturer to rely upon
the physician to warn the patient of the risks of the drug.
5'
Several courts have outlined the advantages of allowing the drug
manufacturer to use the learned intermediary rule. A direct warning to
the patient may interfere with the doctor-patient relationship and the
independent judgment of the doctor, violating the ethical practice of
medicine.6" Also, the warning of possible side effects often contains in-
formation that is too technical for the patient to understand. 1 Addi-
tionally, direct communication from the drug manufacturer to the pa-
tient may be virtually impossible."' Finally, a direct warning to the user
may be impractical because it does not fully reflect the individual fac-
tors involved in selecting a treatment. 6"
For prescription drugs generally, the majority of jurisdictions have
55. See, e.g., In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 881 n.4 (Mich. 1984) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting) (listing 31 jurisdictions adopting the "learned intermediary rule" for prescription
drugs). See also Margaret Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs, and Patient
Information, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 633, 644 (1986) (The learned intermediary doctrine is a general
rule with virtually unanimous acceptance.).
56. Gilhooley, supra note 55, at 642-44. The term "learned intermediary" was first used in
Sterling Drugs, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966). The term was used to describe the
physician's role in warning the patient. 370 F.2d at 85.
57. Gilhooley, supra note 55, at 642-44.
58. See, e.g., Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See also Paul
D. Rheingold, Products Liability--The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.
REV. 947, 987 (1964).
59. Gilhooley, supra note 55, at 642-44.
60. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989); Drunkin v. Syntex
Lab., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381,
400 (Ct. App. 1971).
61. See, e.g., Hill, 884 F.2d at 1070; Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
62. See, e.g., Hill, 884 F.2d at 1070; Terhune, 577 P.2d at 978 (Although this case con-
cerns a prescription intrauterine device, rather than a prescription drug, the principles are the
same.).
63. See, e.g., Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121,
130 (9th Cir. 1968).
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concluded that the manufacturer's duty to adequately warn is satisfied
by warning the prescribing physician.64 The rationale for allowing the
learned intermediary rule is that injury to the patient is best avoided by
warning the physician because the selection and treatment with a pre-
scription product is a medical decision and not a patient decision.68
An exception to the learned intermediary rule was developed by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories."
The court held that the manufacturer of a polio vaccine did have a
duty to directly warn the patient when the vaccine was used in a mass
inoculation program because the policy considerations for the learned
intermediary rule were not present.6" In Reyes, the court explained that
the manufacturer must either directly warn the recipient of the pre-
scription drug or warn the prescribing physician in those cases in which
the doctor makes an independent judgment as to selection of and treat-
ment with the drug. 8 The court applied this test to the facts regarding
the polio vaccination program and-concluded that the mass inoculation
program did not involve an individualized medical decision, so the man-
ufacturer could not use the learned intermediary rule to satisfy its duty
of adequate warning. s
Using similar analysis to the Reyes decision, a small number of
courts held that the manufacturer of contraceptive products must warn
patients directly rather than use the learned intermediary rule.70 These
courts observed that, unlike most other prescription products, the use of
contraceptives is a decision actively made by the patient rather than
the physician.7 1 After the initial decision and treatment, there is little
64. See supra note 55.
65. Gilhooley, supra note 55, at 643-45.
66. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
67. Id. at 1294.
68. Id. at 1295. Often referred to as the Reyes test, the court reasoned:
[I]n the case of a prescription drug which is unavoidably unsafe, and as to which there
is a certain, though small, risk throughout the population, there must be either a warn-
ing-meaningful and complete so as to be understood by the recipient--or an individu-
alized medical judgment that this treatment or medication is necessary and desirable
for this patient.
Id. (emphasis in original).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (ap-
plying Michigan law); Stephens v. G.D. Searle, 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (applying
Michigan law); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 920 (1985).
71. Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 n.l1 (8th Cir. 1989) (summarizing the
cases cited supra note 70).
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contact between the patient and doctor.72 The courts in these jurisdic-
tions concluded that the learned intermediary rule should not be used
for contraceptive products because the physician does not make an in-
dividualized medical decision. a
The large majority of courts concluded that contraceptive products
should not be an exception to the learned intermediary rule.7 4 These
courts cogently argued that the physician makes an individualized med-
ical decision in selection and treatment involving contraceptive prod-
ucts. 78 For example, the court in Allen v. Searle Laboratories76 as-
serted that "the physician makes the ultimate decision as to whether a
particular contraceptive requested by a patient is appropriate. 77 The
learned intermediary rule has been applied to both oral contraceptives
and intrauterine devices. 8
Until the West decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court avoided rul-
ing upon comment k or the learned intermediary rule. The court de-
clined to adopt strict liability for any products until the Arkansas legis-
lature passed Act 111 in 1973.79 The legislature further defined strict
72. id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Beyette v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 823 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1987) (apply-
ing Michigan law); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981) (apply-
ing New Hampshire law); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980)
(applying New York law); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988)
(applying Minnesota law); Tarallo v. Searle Pharmaceutical, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C.
1988) (applying South Carolina law); Goodson v. Searle Lab., 471 F. Supp. 546 (D. Conn. 1978)
(applying Connecticut law); Drunkin v. Syntex Lab, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Tenn. 1977)
(applying Tennessee law); Stafford v. Nipp, 502 So.2d 702 (Ala. 1987); Carmichael v. Reitz, 95
Cal. Rptr 381 (Ct. App. 1971); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Lacy v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398 (Del. 1989); Ricci v. Parke-Davis & Co., 491 So.2d 1182 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 356 N.E.2d 779 (11. 1976); Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386
N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986); Rhoto v. Ribando, 504 So.2d 1119 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Seley v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (Or. 1974); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 307 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975
(Wash. 1978).
75. See, e.g., Seley, 423 N.E.2d at 840 (the patient relies upon the physician's judgment in
selecting the drug and advising the patient in its use); Lacy, 567 A.2d at 401 (the patient relies
upon her physician's expertise in selecting and fitting an intrauterine device).
76. 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989).
77. Id. at 1148.
78. See cases cited supra note 75.
79. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-86-102 (Michie 1987). The Arkansas Supreme Court avoided
adopting strict liability in Gatlin v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 252 Ark. 839, 481 S.W.2d 338
(1972) and in Higgins v. General Motors Co., 250 Ark. 551, 465 S.W.2d 898 (1971). See also
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liability in Act 511 of 1979, the Arkansas Products Liability Act.80
Both of these acts were substantially the same as the strict liability
concepts outlined in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.81 The Arkansas Supreme Court has used the comments to sec-
tion 402A when interpreting these laws even though the comments
were not part of the 1973 or 1979 acts.82
In 1989 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to predict
how the Arkansas courts would address strict liability issues involving
comment k, the learned intermediary rule, and the exception for oral
contraceptives. In Hill v. Searle Laboratories,8" an intrauterine device
(IUD) was inserted into the patient's uterus by a physician who had
received appropriate warnings of possible complications.84 It was dis-
covered three years later that the IUD had perforated the patient's
uterus and was partially embedded in the small bowel.8 The patient
and her husband brought a products liability action against the manu-
facturer of the IUD.8" The trial court granted summary judgment for
the manufacturer, reasoning that the IUD was a prescription product
under comment k of section 402A.8' The trial court further reasoned
that the learned intermediary rule applied to IUDs and that the pa-
tient's doctor received adequate warning of the risk of perforation."
The patient and her husband appealed. 89
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals first considered whether the
Arkansas courts would adopt comment k. They observed that most
other jurisdictions have adopted the comment k doctrine, and that the
Arkansas Supreme Court implicitly adopted some of the comments to
section 402A." The Eighth Circuit agreed with the trial court and the
Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981) (discussing past strict liability
cases in Arkansas).
80. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-116-101 to -107 (Michie 1987).
81. Henry Woods, Product Liability: Is Comparative Fault Winning the Day?, 36 ARK. L.
REv. 360, 364 (1982).
82. See, e.g., Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 653 S.W.2d 128, 133 (1983)
(refers to the comments to § 402A in construing the Arkansas Products Liability Act); General
Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 353, 516 S.W.2d 602, 606 (1974) (refers to comment m to
Section 402A in construing Act 111).
83. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 1065-66.





90. Id. at 1067.
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defendant manufacturer that the Arkansas courts would adopt com-
ment k as a defense to strict liability for prescription products.91
Next, the court discussed whether the Arkansas courts would use
comment k as an affirmative defense. The Eighth Circuit agreed with
jurisdictions that considered it an affirmative defense, requiring a case-
by-case analysis that the benefit outweighed the risk of the product
before allowing the use of comment k.91 The court reasoned that the
wording of comment k itself suggests that it is limited to special prod-
ucts that fill an "exceptional social need." 93 Also, public policy consid-
erations justified limiting comment k to an affirmative defense because
it would be inconsistent to have a blanket exemption for prescription
products and not other products having life-bettering or life-saving
characteristics."4 The appeals court reversed the summary judgment on




The Eighth Circuit predicted that Arkansas would adopt the test
in Reyes when applying the learned intermediary rule to prescription
products. 96 The court noted that the physician is interposed between
the manufacturer and the patient, that the warning of risks is often too
technical for the patient to analyze, and that the manufacturer is often
incapable of directly warning the patient.97 The court concluded that
an individualized medical decision by the physician is required before
the manufacturer could satisfy its duty of warning with the learned
intermediary rule.9
In applying the Reyes test to the facts in Hill, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the selection and use of the IUD did not require an
intervening, individualized medical decision. 9 The court discussed the
minority rule which emphasized the limited input by the physician
when prescribing contraceptive products. °00 It incorrectly predicted
that Arkansas would not allow the application of the learned intermedi-
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1069.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1070.
96. Id.
97. Id. See also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
98. 884 F.2d at 1070.
99. Id. at 1070-71.
100. Id. See also supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 14:199
COMMENT K
ary rule in cases involving contraceptives. 101 The Eighth Circuit re-
versed summary judgment on this issue because there was a dispute in
the record whether the patient had received adequate direct warning of
the risks of harm.
102
In West v. Searle & Co. the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted
comment k.'0 1 The court further held that the comment should be ap-
plied as an affirmative defense which requires the defendant manufac-
turer to prove the product was unavoidably dangerous.10 4 Finally, the
court ruled that on the issue of adequate warning, the learned interme-
diary rule should be applied in cases involving oral contraceptives.10 5
The supreme court first addressed the policy reasons for adopting
comment k. The court reasoned that comment k represents a judgment
that some prescription drugs, despite unavoidable risk of harm, are so
beneficial to society that their manufacturers should not be held strictly
liable for providing them.106 Otherwise, the potential liability from the
inherent risk of harm might increase the costs of these important prod-
ucts beyond the reach of the people who need them. 07 The court was
influenced by the fact that only one court has declined to adopt com-
ment k.'0 1
After adopting comment k, the court was faced with choosing be-
tween applying it to all prescription drugs or treating it as an affirma-
tive defense. 0 9 Once again, the court elected to follow the majority
approach and interpret the comment as an affirmative defense.110 The
court reasoned that the wording of the comment itself indicates that
only "some" drugs out of all prescription drugs were intended to be
101. 884 F.2d at 1070-71.
102. Id. at 1071.
103. 305 Ark. 33, 40, 806 S.W.2d 608, 612 (1991). Rather than affirming the trial court's
summary judgment for the defendants, the supreme court ordered dismissal without prejudice for
all but one of the claims, because the pleadings provided issue rather than factual notice as re-
quired by ARK. R. Civ. P. 8. Id. at 36, 806 S.W.2d at 610. The defendants answered the claim of
strict liability for defective design by raising the defense of comment k. The court reasoned that
their answer implied a tacit assumption that the claim was valid, if the comment k defense is valid
in Arkansas. Thus, the supreme court addressed whether to adopt comment k and how to apply it
under Arkansas law. Id. at 37-38, 806 S.W.2d at 611.
104. 305 Ark. at 41, 806 S.W.2d at 612-13.
105. Id. at 44, 806 S.W.2d at 614.
106. Id. at 39, 806 S.W.2d at 611.
107. Id.
108. Id. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
109. 305 Ark. at 39-40, 806 S.W.2d at 612.
110. Id. at 40, 806 S.W.2d at 612.
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protected by the comment k exception.111 The court was also influenced
by the rejection of a blanket exemption for all prescription drugs by the
American Law Institute membership when discussing the adoption of
section 402A.1 2
In using comment k as an affirmative defense, the manufacturer
must show that the prescription product is unavoidably unsafe.113 In
determining whether the manufacturer has satisfied this burden of
proof, the court referred to the guidelines in Toner to evaluate whether
there is an alternative feasible product with lesser risk.' 14 The Arkan-
sas court observed that risk-benefit analysis only requires that the "bal-
ance 'apparently' tip toward the benefit of a product at the time of
distribution."' 15
Having adopted comment k as an affirmative defense, the court
moved on to the issue of what constitutes adequate warning of the un-
safe nature of the product. 1 6 According to the wording of comment k,
the seller of a proven unavoidably unsafe product may avoid strict lia-
bility for the consequences of the product's use by providing "proper
directions and warning."' 17 The court noted that the duty of adequate
warning, as a general rule, requires that the manufacturer directly
warn the consumer of a product of its risks." 8 However, almost all ju-
risdictions recognize the learned intermediary rule as an exception to
the general requirement of direct warning." 9 The court agreed that a
drug manufacturer should be allowed to rely upon the prescribing doc-
tor to warn the patient of the risks of a prescription drug. 20 Finally,
the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that three cases have rejected
the learned intermediary doctrine in cases involving contraceptives. 12
The court rejected the reasoning of those cases that a physician fills
only a passive role in a patient's decision to take an oral contracep-
111. Id.
112. Id. See 38 A.L.I. PRoc. 19, at 97-98 (1961).
113. 305 Ark. at 41, 806 S.W.2d at 612.
114. Id. See also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
115. 305 Ark. at 41, 806 S.W.2d at 613.
116. Id. at 42, 806 S.W.2d at 613 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECO ND) TORTS § 402A cmt. k
(1977)).
117. Id. Usually the manufacturer has a duty to warn the consumer of a product under both
negligence and strict liability theories. See Madden, supra note 16, §§ 10.3-10.4.
118. 305 Ark. at 42, 806 S.W.2d at 613.
119. Id.
120. Id. See also supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.




tive. *2 In contrast, the court concluded that although the patient may
make the initial choice regarding birth control, "after that, the physi-
cian would exercise his medical judgment concerning the best method
of contraception for his patient." '12 s Therefore, the court found the
learned intermediary rule applicable to cases involving oral
contraceptives.'22
The Arkansas Supreme Court elected not to decide whether it
would follow Reyes and require an individualized medical decision
before allowing the use of the learned intermediary rule.125 The court
determined that it was unnecessary to make that decision because the
"stated public policy reasons for the learned intermediary doctrine are
present with respect to oral contraceptives." 126
Although it did not address the scope of the Reyes test, West v.
Searle & Co. is still one of the court's more significant recent rulings.
The Arkansas Supreme Court for the first time explicitly adopted the
comment k doctrine of unavoidably unsafe products and provided
guidelines for its application.
The court followed the vast majority of jurisdictions in adopting
comment k as an affirmative defense. Also, the court rejected the per se
application of comment k to all prescription drugs, as advocated by the
California Supreme Court in. Brown.
12 7
The Arkansas court's decision to limit comment k to an affirmative
defense has important implications for plaintiffs and defendants in pre-
scription product cases. In a typical case involving an allegedly defec-
tive design, the plaintiff is often required to use risk-utility analysis and
show the existence of a feasible alternative product.12 8 In contrast,
when a drug manufacturer raises the comment k defense in response to




126. Id. See also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
127. 305 Ark. at 40, 806 S.W.2d at 612 (the court cites and rejects the decision in Brown,
751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988)). One justice dissented from the majority opinion. He would adopt
comment k as a blanket exemption for all prescription drugs for the reasons outlined in Brown.
305 Ark. at 45-46, 806 S.W.2d at 615 (Hayes, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 50-53 and
accompanying text.
128. MADDEN supra note 16, § 6.12, at 233. However, Arkansas does not require the plain-
tiff to prove the feasibility of an alternative safer design, but rather lets the jury consider it as a
factor in determining if the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous. See




a claim that one of its products was defectively designed, the West
court allocated the burden of showing utility greater than risk to the
defendant manufacturer.1 19 In evaluating the drug manufacturer's
proof of risk-utility, the court also shifted the burden of showing the
lack of a feasible alternative product from the plaintiff to the
manufacturer.130
The Arkansas Supreme Court's choice of risk-utility analysis con-
trasts with the statutory incorporation of the consumer contemplation
test by the Arkansas Products Liability Act.13' The risk-utility test de-
fines unreasonably dangerous as the magnitude of the risk of harm out-
weighing the benefit of the product.132 On the other hand, the con-
sumer contemplation test evaluates whether the product is dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be considered by an ordinary user
with common knowledge of the product's characteristics.' When the
drug manufacturer raises the comment k defense, the ruling in West
changed the emphasis from the plaintiff's proof of what a reasonable
consumer would contemplate to the defendant's focus upon risk-utility.
In West the court also required the drug manufacturer to prove
that the warning was adequate prior to using the comment k defense. 
34
Usually, the plaintiff must prove inadequate warning to recover under a
failure to warn theory of strict liability.3 5 The West decision shifted
the burden of proof that is usually borne by the plaintiff to the drug
manufacturer raising comment k as an affirmative defense.
Finally, the court addressed the learned intermediary rule and de-
clined to decide whether to adopt the Eighth Circuit's limited approach
in Reyes, which requires an individualized medical decision before ap-
129. 305 Ark. at 41, 806 S.W.2d at 612. The court ruled "for the comment to protect the
designer of the product, the benefit of the product must outweigh the risk." Id.
130. Id. The court reasoned "the designer of the drug must show that the product is 'un-
avoidably unsafe.' Necessarily then, there must be no feasible alternative design .... Id.
131. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102 (Michie 1987) provides:
Unreasonably dangerous means that a product is dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary and reasonable buyer, consumer, or user
who acquires or uses the product, assuming the ordinary knowledge of the community
or of similar buyers, users, or consumers as to its characteristics, propensities, risks,
dangers, and proper and improper uses . ...
132. KEETON et al., supra note 14, § 99, at 699.
133. KEETON et al., supra note 14, § 99, at 698.
134. 305 Ark. at 42, 806 S.W.2d 608, 613. The court ruled "adequate warning of danger
. . . must be proved before a judgment is granted on the basis of the affirmative defense set out in
comment k." Id.
135. KEETON et al., supra note 14, § 99, at 697.
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plying the rule.1"6 This approach provides the court greater flexibility in
future cases, allowing it to balance the goals of patient autonomy and
informed consent with the benefits of the learned intermediary rule.
The Arkansas Supreme Court's interpretation of comment k pro-
motes consistency in the law and good public policy. Under the court's
approach, prescription drugs of limited social value, such as depilatory
agents, will be treated like most other commercial products, and the
consumer has increased protection from the product's risk of harm
through the application of strict liability. The protective umbrella of
comment k will be reserved for highly beneficial prescription products
for which the defendant manufacturer can show benefit exceeding risk
and that there is no safer alternative product available serving the same
needs.
Ian Birkett
136. 305 Ark. at 44, 806 S.W.2d at 614. See also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying
text.
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